



FROM DISCORD TO STREETS

DECEMBER 2025
A WORKING PAPER

THE RISE AND IMPACT OF NEPAL'S GEN Z PROTEST

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From Discord to Streets

The Rise and Impact of Nepal's Gen Z Protest

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Executive Summary

The September 2025 Gen Z protests in Nepal were a youth-led movement against deep-rooted corruption, political favoritism, aging political leadership, and economic inequality. Led mainly by young people between 13 to 28 years, the protests erupted from frustration over politicians' children exhibiting luxury lifestyles on social media, high youth unemployment, and a political system where the same leaders kept rotating power without completing full terms or bringing real change. The government's ban on 26 social media platforms on September 4 was the breaking point that ignited the movement. Various groups came together, all pushing for change while concerned about potential violence. The protests, which took place on 8-9 September, drew comparisons to recent youth movements in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. What started as peaceful demonstrations quickly intensified, ultimately forcing the Prime Minister to resign on the second day.

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




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01

Introduction



1. Introduction

Nepal recently experienced a major socio-political protest known as the Generation Z (Gen Z) Protest. This protest took place on 8-9 September 2025 and was primarily organized and led by young people from Gen Z - those born between 1997 and 2012.ⁱ This generation is defined by growing up in the digital age, with constant internet access and heavy social media use from an early age. In Nepal, where 96 percent of people can access the internet at least through their phones, the September Gen Z movement caught everyone by surprise. It quickly gained momentum through social media platforms and online networks, becoming a powerful digital force that challenged political leaders and demanded they be held accountable.

The Gen Z protest initially sparked through an online movement against the political nepotism where the children of top Nepali politicians were detested for flaunting their luxury items and goods, symbolic to an innately merited lifestyle in different social media platforms. It's contagious spread immediately tapped a long-standing generational grievance against political corruption and gerontocratic leadership for decades. As a matter of fact, Nepal had 15 governments since the restoration of democracy in April 2006, none of which had completed a full five-year term shuffled between three major parties namely, Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), and CPN (Maoist Centre) and their coalition by taking turn.


Not just that, the social media ban that the Government of Nepal implemented on 4th September 2025 is also believed to trigger the Gen Z protest in Nepal fueling the frustrations of younger generations. The decision of the government to ban 26 social

ⁱ American Psychologist researching on generational differences, Dr. Jean Twenge is believed to have coined the term in her book *iGen* in 2017. Whereas an American think tank Pew Research Center is widely recognized for its definition of the generation as those born between 1997 and 2012.

media platforms within the country was perceived as the government's interference on people's freedom of expression and a deliberate move to control public life. Whereas this was not the first-time when government of Nepal took such measure in the name of social media regulation and digital safety. In November 2023, the Maoist leader Prachanda led government had banned TikTok in Nepal for almost 9 months which was claimed as an attempt to silence the critical voices against the then government. It was backed by the claims from the media on deletion of videos which were posted in the platform earlier.

Thus, the emergence of Gen Z protest in Nepal can be attributed to multiple factors including socio-political frustrations among younger mass due to rampant corruption, lack of trust in government institutions, poor governance, skepticism on political leadership and pessimism towards a secure future of young generation in Nepal.

The Gen Z protest in Nepal is also believed to be a part of broader regional wave of youth-led movements against government corruption and unfair policy reforms that took place in Sri Lanka during 2022 and in Bangladesh during 2024, all of which are confrontations against state oppression. Although the youth-led protest in a Southeast Asian nation- Indonesia which erupted against the privileges provided to parliamentary members and corrupt elites does not seem to have any direct effect on emergence of the protest in Nepal, it is being viewed as part of a wider regional wave of youth discontent and digital-era political activism.



The protest that occurred in Nepal was a multi-generational appeal as the agendas of anti-corruption and non-tolerance to poor governance in Nepal were lingering since decades. The lead of the protest however was shouldered to the younger generations. Though there were no notable, single actor who led the protest, the movement was believed to be backed by multiple actors and stakeholders. A youth-led non-governmental organization named 'Hami Nepal' rose as a central figure by the end of resignation by the immediate Prime Minister on the second day of the protest. Other than that, the youth-led groups such as Youth Against Corruption, All Nepal Gen Z officials, anti-corruption protest group, Gen Z Nepal, unorganized groups of school/college students and celebrities/

public figures such as singers, artists, and entrepreneurs had publicly backed the protest.

Not just at the federal level, the protest groups and unorganized forces were visible at different city centers where the protest and physical violence were witnessed. For instance, the groups such as 'Gen Z Chitwan' and 'Youth Retaliation Against Corruption' were reported to have actively participated in the protest in major cities and towns, including Damak, Birtamod, Itahari, Biratnagar, Janakpur, Bharatpur, Pokhara, Birgunj, Butwal, Bhairahawa, Tulsipur, and Dhangadhi, among others. Whereas multiple fractions of smaller groups led by individual students were also witnessed during the protest.

In sum, the protests spreading across the country created remarkable pressure that forced political leaders to step down from the government. What really stood out was how thousands of young people came together as their own movement, separate from traditional political groups, something Nepal had not witnessed in its political history. It showed that Nepal's newer generations, who are educated and skilled with digital tools, had been seriously underestimated. When they decided to challenge the established power system, they turned into a powerful force for change.


02

What happened During the Protest?



2. What happened During the Protest?

The Gen Z protest in Nepal was characterized by rapid organization not only through unbanned social media platforms like TikTok but also through banned ones (during Gen Z protest period) by using VPNs to bypass government restrictions. Users from political leaders to ordinary citizens remained highly active online despite the bans. Despite having no formal leadership structure with announced leaders, the movement maintained remarkable coordination and unity of purpose. The protests gained broad support from celebrities, artists, civil society activists, and various political figures, demonstrating that the frustrations extended far beyond just the younger generation. Throughout the initial phase, the movement maintained clear messaging focused on anti-corruption and democratic rights, making it easy for people to understand and support their cause.



PC: IANS

While officially leaderless, several groups and individuals played crucial roles in the movement. The “Hami Nepal” NGO-based group helped coordinate efforts across different cities and regions. Social media influencers used their platforms to mobilize thousands of youths, while educated millennials with constitutional and human rights backgrounds shaped public opinion through online discussions. Emerging political leaders like Kathmandu Mayor Balen Shah and others provided guidance and legitimacy to the movement by sharing their expertise and experience with the protesters.

On 8 September 2025, the first day of major unrest, Gen Z protesters gathered nonviolently in Kathmandu and major cities like Pokhara, Biratnagar, Chitwan, and Butwal, organized decentralize via social media and Discord. By late afternoon, breaches into prohibited areas around the Federal Parliament in Kathmandu prompted police to deploy tear gas and rubber bullets, escalating to live gunfire on largely peaceful crowds, including uniformed school children. This excessive force resulted in 19 deaths and over 400 injuries that day, with nationwide curfews imposed.

In the aftermath of the deadly clashes during the Gen Z-led protests on 8 September 2025, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli publicly attributed the escalation of violence to external elements, stating that the originally peaceful demonstrations had been “hijacked” by opportunistic groups intent on sowing chaos, rather than reflecting the core demands against corruption and the social media ban. This echoed sentiments from the Gen Z movement itself, which disavowed the destructive turn in a formal statement, emphasizing their commitment to nonviolent civic engagement.

As public outrage mounted over the deaths of at least 19 protesters, mostly youth, killed by police gunfire and rubber bullets, the government’s response drew sharp criticism for evading accountability. KP Oli’s administration did not accept responsibility for the fatalities or the excessive use of force, with officials instead framing the incident as a regrettable outcome of the alleged hijacking. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for independent investigations into the crackdown, highlighting the lack of transparency and the failure to hold security forces accountable.

The cabinet, meanwhile, did not resign en masse; only a handful of ministers stepped down on moral grounds in the immediate hours following the violence, including Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak and Agriculture Minister Ramnath Adhikari, amid mounting pressure from protesters and opposition parties. The social media ban was reversed later that night. It was not until the next day, September 9, that KP Oli himself tendered his resignation.

The second day of the protest on 9 September 2025, saw things spiral dramatically out of control. Protesters ignored curfews, and what followed was widespread destruction, fires, and looting across Nepal. In Kathmandu Valley, the chaos focused on powerful symbols of government: protesters stormed the Federal Parliament building in New Baneshwor, ransacking it and setting parts of it on fire while destroying documents and vehicles. Singha Durbar, the main government complex housing the Prime Minister’s office and various ministries, was badly burned. The Supreme Court was looted and burnt and its records destroyed, forcing it to operate out of tents.¹ Even the Presidential Palace in Maharajgunj was burnt.²

Political leaders' residences and party properties came under widespread attack across the country on September 9. Then Prime Minister Oli's residence in Baluwatar was torched, forcing him to be airlifted to safety.³ Former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's home in Budhanilkantha was set on fire, injuring both him and his wife, who was serving as Foreign Minister at the time. The couple was beaten by rioters before being airlifted by the Army. Another former prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also had his residence in Lalitpur torched⁴, and former prime minister Jalnath Khanal's home was likewise set ablaze and his wife was severely injured in fire.⁵

Beyond these high-profile incidents, private properties of political leaders and their members from the major parties were extensively targeted across the country. Specifically, private properties of 125 Nepali Congress leaders, 158 private properties and assets of CPN-UML leaders, and private properties of 11 CPN (Maoist Centre) leaders were reported vandalized, looted, or set ablaze. According to multiple reports, party offices of the three major parties (Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist Centre)) suffered significant damage, with 48 district and provincial offices of Nepali Congress including its headquarters in Sanepa, 64 offices of CPN-UML, and the party headquarters of CPN (Maoist Centre) attacked, ransacked and burned. In addition, dozens of party vehicles, archives, and local buildings were destroyed, and numerous party flags were publicly desecrated or burned in major cities and provincial centers.


A preliminary police report, provided details on the scale of force deployed over the two days of unrest, documenting 13,182 total firings nationwide including 2,642 rounds of live ammunition (mostly from INSAS rifles, SLRs, and pistols), 1,884 rubber bullets, 2,377 warning shots, and 6,279 tear gas shells with the heaviest concentration in Kathmandu Valley at 6,891 instances. The report confirmed a total of 75 deaths across both days, the majority from police gunfire using high-velocity rounds targeted at protesters' upper bodies and heads (as verified by post-mortem examinations), alongside 20 fatalities in a Bhatbhateni supermarket fire, three police officers beaten to death by crowds, and ten deaths among prisoners in facilities in Nepalgunj, Dhading, and Ramechhap. It highlighted operational shortcomings, such as underestimating protester numbers (initially projected at 4000-5,000), inadequate barricades that allowed side-lane advances, and violations of protocols requiring warning shots and lower-body targeting, amid broader intelligence failures by agencies like the National Investigation Department.⁶

At Nakhu Jail, a jailbreak and arson released all inmates, including former home minister and RSP leader Rabi Lamichhane. Police posts were looted including firearms included and clashes in Koteshwor killed three police personnel. Private properties were not spared either: the Hilton Hotel, Kantipur media offices (servers damaged), Ncell offices

(documents stolen), and Bhatbhateni stores were all hit. Fires at Bhatbhateni killed at least 20 people. Tribhuvan International Airport had to close for at least a day.

Outside the capital, in Chitwan, both Bharatpur Metropolis and former Prime Minister Prachanda's residence were burned, with 14 people injured from gunfire the day before. Similar destruction happened in Makwanpur, Dhading (2 deaths), and Ramechhap (3 deaths) districts.

In Koshi Province, in Sunsari's Itahari, Dharan, and Inaruwa, 46 public structures were damaged: municipal offices and wards burnt/looted, alongside Rajaswa and Akhtiyar offices. Police facilities (14) were torched, with 66 posts merged post-protest. Private damages included VIP homes (e.g., former CM Bhim Acharya), party offices, and Bhatbhateni stores. Vehicles (127 total) were destroyed, with 2 civilian deaths and 36 injuries. In Morang's Biratnagar, the district office, court, and chief minister's residence were torched; 8 rural municipalities and QFX cinema vandalized.



Madhesh Province, in Bara (Kalaiya and Simara offices/police posts burnt; politicians' homes looted), Parsa (Birgunj Metropolis, 17 vehicles burnt), Rautahat (5 municipalities looted, 24 injured), Sarlahi (20 units), and Dhanusha (Janakpur Provincial Assembly/ministries torched; 81 vehicles destroyed; police, 109 units affected). Chief Minister Satish Singh faced resignation calls but continued.

Gandaki Province's Kaski District (Pokhara) experienced severe impacts: the Metropolis office and 20-33 wards damaged; prison jailbreak (773-900 escaped); assembly/CM office/ministries torched; Land Revenue Office and District Court burnt; private hotels, Bhatbhateni, and officials' residences targeted, with 33 four-wheelers/85 two-wheelers destroyed. With CM Surendra Raj Pandey leading reconstruction efforts, including budget cuts to save Rs. 50 crore.


Lumbini Province reported arson in Rupandehi (politicians' homes in Butwal/Bhairahawa, Chaudhary factory looted) and Banke (juvenile jailbreak), Kohalpur municipal's and ward offices burnt and looted, Gautam Buddha Airport vandalized.

Karnali Province distinguished itself with concentrated damages in Surkhet (97 structures; assembly/CM office/residence/Birendranagar Municipality/12 wards torched; party offices damaged; Dr. Prem Bahadur Khadka's home burnt to ashes); Jumla, including Chandannath Municipality); and Mugu (unspecified). Province-wide, CM office/7 ministries/assembly torched (furniture/cameras burnt); 32 govt vehicles (15 four-wheelers/17 two-wheelers) destroyed; including 2 lakh ID cards.

In contrast, Sudurpaschim Province focused on far-western areas like Kailali (jailbreak, Foreign Minister Deuba's home torched, clashes/gunfire, casinos/hotels looted) and Kanchanpur (casinos/hotels looted) with broader infrastructure disruptions.⁷

Nationwide, over 300 municipal/ward offices, Road Dept, and CIAA offices were burnt; elite assets were looted, and various monuments were destroyed.

Of 13,591 escaped prisoners, many remain absconding, exacerbating crime fears.⁸ Damages exceed Rs. 100 billion, with 435 govt structures affected (24 red-stickered); reconstruction committees prioritize courts and fund establishment ongoing.⁹ Services resume in tents/alternatives; curfews lifted by Sep 13, but disruptions persist in daily life, education, and economy. Social harmony is disrupted, with political polarization, trust deficits, and threats to federal democracy; anti-NGO sentiments challenge interventions.



03

Gen Z Protest: From Nonviolence to Violence

3. Gen Z Protest: From Nonviolence to Violence

The Gen Z protest in Nepal began as a powerful nonviolent movement on the first day but transformed into violent unrest by the second day. The primary catalyst for violence was the government's brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters. On the first day, government security forces killed 19 unarmed demonstrators, sparking nationwide outrage. Rather than deterring the movement, this brutal response intensified public anger and drew more people to join the protests. The killing of peaceful protesters transformed what began as a focused Gen Z movement into a broader uprising involving people from all backgrounds who were frustrated with both the killings and the overall governing system of the country. Previous research identifies state repression as a key factor that escalates protest violenceⁱⁱ, and the Nepal case perfectly demonstrates this dynamic. The government's decision to use lethal force against peaceful demonstrators created a cycle of violence that they could no longer control.

The second critical factor was the protest's leaderless nature. The Gen Z movement had no central coordination or defined leadership to guide and control the demonstrations. While this decentralized structure initially helped the movement spread rapidly through digital platforms, it became a major weakness when violence erupted. No individual or group had the authority or influence to bring the protests back under control. Even when some Gen Z organizers issued statements saying the violence had gone beyond their original peaceful plans, their appeals were ignored by the angry protesters. More tellingly, when respected figures like Kathmandu Mayor Balen Shah - considered a Gen Z icon - called for protesters to stop the violence and go home after the Prime Minister Oli's resignation, the crowds did not listen. The violence continued until all targeted government institutions and politicians' homes were damaged or destroyed.

ii Ives, B., & Lewis, J. S. (2020). From rallies to riots: Why some protests become violent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64(5), 958-986.

The protesters' inadequate preparation significantly contributed to the violent turn. They failed in several critical areas such as the lack of spoiler management, no risk assessment, and unclear end goals of the protest. The organizers had no strategy to deal with troublemakers or opportunistic groups who might hijack their movement. Several accounts suggest that while Gen Z activists initiated the protest, numerous other groups exploited the situation for their own benefit. These groups actively contributed to the violence, but because no specific organizations were identified as main instigators, it essentially became chaotic mob violence. The protesters did not adequately discuss what could go wrong or develop strategies to handle different scenarios. Basic questions like "What if the government responds with force?" or "How do we maintain peaceful discipline?" were never properly addressed, leaving them unprepared when violence erupted.

The movement also lacked clear, measurable objectives or an exit strategy. While they stated they were protesting corruption and the social media ban, they never established what would constitute success. Even when some demands were partially met, there was no mechanism to declare victory and wind down the protests peacefully.

The government, on the other hand, made several critical mistakes that worsened the situation. Security personnel were not adequately trained or instructed to minimize casualties during protests. Poor coordination between government agencies, home administration, and security forces prevented an effective response. Most importantly, instead of seeking solutions after the horrific first day, the government further escalated tensions. Many analysts argued that Prime Minister Oli could have prevented much of the destruction if he had resigned immediately after the first day and lifted the social media ban, rather than waiting until protesters began vandalizing his own private and official residences.



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Factors Behind Rapid Success

4. Factors Behind Rapid Success


Despite not achieving its original goal of fighting corruption in a conclusive manner, the movement successfully brought down Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's government within 48 hours. The movement gained remarkable backing across different segments of society. While the ruling parties opposed it, major opposition parties like CPN (Maoist Centre)¹⁰ and Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)¹¹ offered moral support. Smaller parties, including those led by former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai, also stood with the protesters. This broad political support legitimized the movement and isolated the ruling government. The crucial turning point was support from Balen Shah, Kathmandu's popular young mayor. His backing brought thousands of followers into the streets. Social media influencers, artists, singers, and civil society activists who had been criticizing corruption also rallied behind the cause. Young Nepalese living abroad, though unable to participate physically, ran energetic social media campaigns called 'nepokids' which amplified the movement's reach.

Corruption served as a powerful rallying point that united diverse groups. In Nepal, people see excessive corruption as the main reason for underdevelopment, poor public services, and youth migration abroad. Citizens were frustrated with the government's failure to investigate high-profile corruption cases and prevent future corruption. This shared anger created unusual solidarity among groups that rarely agreed on political issues. The killing of 19 protesters created enormous psychological strain on security forces. They faced intense public criticism for killing innocent demonstrators, making them reluctant to use force again on the second day of the protest. This psychological pressure effectively weakened the government's ability to control subsequent protests, allowing demonstrators to defy curfews and attack government installations with reduced fear of lethal retaliation.

The government's institutional weaknesses became glaringly crucial during the crisis. Agencies completely failed to gather intelligence about the protests or share information effectively. The state lacked the ability to manage demonstrations without resorting to violence. When protesters attacked police stations nationwide, other security agencies did not provide backup. Similarly, when administrative offices were destroyed, no state agencies offered adequate support. Protesters quickly recognized these weaknesses and exploited them using both peaceful and violent tactics.

Both major ruling parties (Nepali Congress and CPN (UML)) were internally fractured. Many leaders and party workers had been calling for new leadership for years, frustrated that old guard leaders were damaging their parties' public image. These internal divisions weakened their public presence, leaving party members unable to defend their own government. While dissenting voices within these parties did not openly support the protest, they did not oppose it either. Most party leaders and workers lacked the courage to resist protesters even when their personal property was being destroyed, which only emboldened the demonstrators.

The complete digitalization of the protest was perhaps the most crucial success factor. The movement was entirely organized through Discord, where protesters created sophisticated coordination systems across the country. They divided into location-based groups and specialized roles like media coordination and logistics planning, allowing precise planning of timing, locations, and tactics. The digital strategy extended across multiple platforms: TikTok for reaching younger audiences, Facebook for older supporters, Twitter for engaging journalists and politicians, and WhatsApp for instant communication during protests. These platforms built widespread support and brought together unlikely allies from opposition politicians to diaspora youth. Most powerfully, digital platforms exposed government brutality in real-time. Videos and images of the 19 killings spread instantly across social media, creating a public relations disaster for authorities. Each piece of content showing police violence motivated more people to join the next day's protests, creating a cycle where government brutality fueled greater participation rather than deterring it. This digital exposure of state violence significantly contributed to the government's rapid downfall.



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05

When Protest Becomes an Uprising: Some Dvistic Features

5. When Protest Becomes an Uprising: Some Dvistinctive Features

Nepal's Gen Z protest has some distinctive features that set it apart from other recent protests in the country. The most striking was how it organized itself through social media before transforming into massive street demonstrations in Kathmandu and beyond. Social media was not just used to spread the word, protesters relied on it in real-time during the street actions to coordinate participation and even to call off protests when needed.



Unlike traditional protests that are centrally organized and coordinated locally, the Gen Z protest was leaderless and spread out. While everyone called it the Gen Z protest, it was made up of many different individuals and groups organizing in multiple locations (both inside and outside Kathmandu Valley) without necessarily working together in a coordinated way. What united these scattered groups was a common message: standing against corruption and demanding the social media ban be lifted.

This decentralized approach, however, led to mixed and conflicting messages among protesters. For instance, when the protest turned violent after 19 protesters were killed on the first day, some Gen Z groups publicly distanced themselves from the violence. They announced they had nothing to do with the attacks that emerged from what started as peaceful demonstrations, and even urged participants to go home, suspecting that troublemakers had hijacked the movement. Meanwhile, other Gen Z groups continued protesting despite calls to stop and took more aggressive and violent action in response to their fellow protesters being killed. This lack of a unified voice in such a leaderless, decentralized movement produced harmful results on both sides, peaceful protesters were killed, and public and private properties were destroyed.

Another crucial feature of the Gen Z protest was how its goals evolved in real-time. It began as a focused outcry against government corruption and the social media ban, but not as a movement to overthrow the government. But the protest transformed dramatically when 19 protesters were killed. That bloodshed became a turning point that reshaped everything. What started as demands for accountability suddenly crystallized into three concrete, non-negotiable goals: Prime Minister KP Oli must resign, a citizen-led government headed by apolitical figures must be formed, and the House of Parliament must be dissolved to make way for fresh federal elections.


This shift reveals something profound about how movements can be radicalized by state violence. The deaths did not just anger people, they fundamentally changed what protesters believed was necessary and possible. Within just 48 hours, a loose collection of grievances had hardened into specific political demands that were ultimately negotiated and accepted. The government, faced with unstoppable momentum and having lost all legitimacy after the killings, had no choice but to come to the table. What the protesters could not achieve through peaceful demonstration, they secured through the moral authority that came from their fallen peers. The blood of those 19 young people did not just fuel the anger rather it gave the movement the power to demand and win a complete political reset.



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06

Lessons Learnt



6. Lessons Learnt

Nepal's Gen Z protests of 8-9 September 2025 exposed fundamental weaknesses in the country's political system while demonstrating the unprecedented power of digitally coordinated youth movements. The KP Oli government collapsed within 48 hours due to a perfect storm: state violence that backfired, sophisticated digital coordination through Discord, divided ruling parties, paralyzed security institutions, and widespread support spanning opposition parties to civil society. Each factor alone was significant, but together they created unstoppable momentum for toppling down of the government. However, the movement's success in toppling the government should not be confused with achieving its stated goals. Corruption remains unaddressed, the systematic destruction of public infrastructure has created immediate governance crises, and more than 5000 escaped prisoners continue to threaten public safety. The protesters won government change, but not the systemic reform they demanded.

The violence that overtook the movement on the second day reveals critical lessons about leaderless protests in the digital age. While decentralized organization allowed the movement to spread rapidly and resist government suppression, it also meant no one could stop the destruction once it began. The same structure that was the movement's greatest strength became its fatal weakness. The targeting of government buildings, political residences, and party offices across all seven provinces simultaneously suggests more organization than a truly "leaderless" movement would produce, raising unanswered questions about who coordinated these attacks and for what purpose. The fact that respected figures like Mayor Balen Shah could not stop the violence even after the Prime Minister resigned indicates either a complete loss of control or the presence of organized spoiler groups with different agendas, a distinction that remains crucial but unexplored.

The path forward presents Nepal with profound challenges that extend beyond simply rebuilding burned buildings. The appointment of Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister (Nepal's first female PM) and the planned dissolution of Parliament

represent attempts at political reset, but they do not address the underlying problems that sparked the protests. The military's role in restoring order, while necessary in the immediate crisis, sets a troubling element in a young democracy. More fundamentally, the movement has exposed a generational divide that will not be easily bridged: majority young Nepalis no longer trust traditional political parties or processes, yet they lack the organizational structures to translate protest energy into governing alternatives. Unless the interim government and whatever follows it genuinely address corruption, create pathways for youth political participation, and restore faith in democratic institutions, Nepal risks either sliding into prolonged instability or seeing the same cycle repeat. The 74 deaths demand more than compensation payments; they demand the systemic change that motivated those protesters to take to the streets in the first place.



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ABOUT CENTRE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Centre for Social Change (CSC) is a non-profit making social think-tank based in Kathmandu, Nepal. Since its establishment in 2015, CSC has been actively working to bring positive transformation in the socio-political dynamics of Nepali society through involvements in the fields of research, development practice, education, advocacy, and community mobilization. CSC's current works are focused on issues surround conflict transformation, peacebuilding, democracy and governance, migration, labor and employment, civic space, civil society development, public policy, climate change, and social development.

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